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ABSTRACT
In these days of spiralling software costs and the proliferation of computers,
software testing during development is now recognized as a critical aspect of the software
engineering process, an aspect that must be improved in terms of cost and timeliness.
This thesis describes one method that may guide software testing by analyzing the regions
of input associated with each fault as it is detected. These software failure regions are
defined and a method of failure region analysis is described in detail. The thesis
describes how this analysis may be used to detect non-obviously redundant test cases.
A preliminary examination of the manual analysis method is performed with a set
of programs from a prior reliability experiment. Based on faults discovered during the
previous experiment, this thesis defines the reachability conditions, the error generation
conditions, and the conditions in which an error is not masked by later processing.
The manual analysis of failure regions can be a difficult process, with difficulty
dependent on program size, program complexity, and the size of the input data space.
Program constructs and events that simplify the analysis process are also described. The
thesis explains variable contamination and the effects of vertical and horizontal
contamination. The thesis also describes the indirect benefits of performing failure region
analysis. Finally, there are several open questions raised by this research, and these
questions are presented as ideas for future research.
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I. BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH
A. INTRODUCTION
In this technologically advanced age of space and underwater exploration, rapid
mass transit, reliable global communications, and expanding research and developn'ent
into the unknown, computers are having an increasing impact on our every day lives. The
role of computers have come to permeate every aspect of human life - the cars that we
drive to work, the elevators that we take to our offices, the appliances that we use to cook
our food, the entertainment that we enjoy, and the various means that we use to
communicate with each other are all heavily influenced by computers.
When IBM unbundled their software in 1969 by producing and selling their
hardware and software separately, this contributed to the growth of a software industry
which is now flourishing (Shelly and Cashman, 1984, p.17.2). As early as 1976, the ex-
pense incurred in producing and maintaining software exceeded ten billion dollars and the
joint revenues of software suppliers exceeded one billion dollars (Bahr, 1980, p.1). In
a Department of Defense planning document, it was discovered that 80% of current and
future DoD programs in the 1985 - 1989 time frame would contain a significant software
component, and by 1990, 85% of DoD's embedded systems would be allocated to
software (Cavano, 1985, p. 1449). In 1984, the computer industry was comprised of more
than 10,000 computer companies with revenues in excess of 75 billion dollars. Shelly
and Cashman predicted that between 1984 and 1989 the software industry would grow
at a rate exceeding 25% a year and that software sales would ex".reed 30 billion dollars
(Shelly and Cashman, 1984, p.17.4).
As computers are used increasingly in critical commercial, on-line, and real-time
applications, the demand for reliable, fault tolerant software systems becomes more criti-
cal. The issues of software testing and fault tolerance are becoming increasingly serious
as software systems become larger and more complex, as computer systems become
independent of human input, and as safety becomes more software dependent. Blum
argues that "developing better computing systems, e.g., safer, more reliable, more secure,
is an issue that software engineers must address (if not solve)" (Blum, 1989, p.1).
Computer involvement in our daily lives has reached the point where its impact
goes virtually unnoticed until something goes wrong. It is important to point out that
safety in computer dependent systems is threatened by common, seemingly simple faults
as well as more serious faults. For the purposes of this paper, a fault is defined as an
accidental condition that causes a functional unit to fail to perform its required function.
An error is a discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition
and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition. A failure is the
termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform its required function. (Glossary,
1983) The presence of faults in program code determines the failures that software can
experience. In their study of fault sensitivity, Voas and Morell show that there is no
simple relationship that describes the impact a software fault can have on the failures in
a program. (Voas and Morell, Dec 1989, p.1) In its cumulative list of computer failures,
the Special Interest Group on Software Engineering (SIGSOFT) details over 500 computer
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failures in 22 areas of every day life. An examination of this list also reveals that many
of these tragic and expensive failures were caused by 'simple mistakes.' (Neumann,
1989, RISKS, pp. 5 - 21)
Based on the premise that common faults can be as critical as serious faults, an
efficient method for finding common faults is imperative. One approach to this problem
is to study the occurrence of errors in proximity to other errors. Known as error
clustering, Myers describes this phenomenon as the probability of the existence of more
errors in a section of a program is proportional to the number of errors already found in
that section (Myers, 1979, p.15). In order to develop this fault finding method, it is
necessary to understand how test data causes these faults to produce software failures.
In other words, it is necessary to determine what regions of the program's input space are
mapped by faults in the program source code to failures in the output space. These
regions have been called 'failure regions.' (Ammann and Knight, 1988, p. 419)
While there have been several studies which addressed the concept of failure re-
gions, none of these studies analyzed failure regions in light of improving testing
efficiency, and none have discussed the derivation of failure regions from faults identified
in the program source code. This thesis is an analysis of the process of identifying failure
regions, evaluating how this process can be made more efficient.
The ultimate goal of this research is an in-depth understanding of failure regions
and their impact on the testing process. Additionally, analysis techniques will be used
to examine the conditions bounding the failure regions. Finally, this research will also
serve as a foundation for further research efforts in the areas of error clustering and
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failure regions. Prior to examining the specifics of failure regions, a brief summary is
presented of relevant previous work in the field of software testing.
B. FAILURE REGIONS
As stated, there has been a significant void in the area of failure regions and error
clustering, however, the idea of manipulating the input data to refine the testing process
is clearly gaining momentum. Shimeall and Griffin define a software failure region as
that portion of a program input space that is mapped by a program defect into a
failure or erroneous program result. This region is bounded by inequalities deriving
the combination of three sources: the reachability conditions for the code with the
defect, the conditions under which the calculations in that code produces an er-
roneous value, and the conditions in which the value isn't masked by later process-
ing. (Shimeall and Griffin, 1989, p.1)
It is important to note that the failure region is part of the input space and not the fault
itself. The failure region is eventually mapped into a program failure. Once the program
fault is identified, the program source code can be analyzed to determine the failure
region. Once the failure region is isolated, any test cases that fall within that region can
be omitted from the testing process until the fault is corrected, while other test cases can
proceed. Once the fault is removed by modification of the program source code, the
failure region can be used as a guide for testing the correctness of the modification. This
process allows for the elimination of redundant test cases and permits detection of
multiple faults. Subsequently, this process allows for improvement of the initial testing
process as well as any subsequent regression testing that is conducted (Shimeall and
Griffin, 1989, pp. 1,2).
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The concept of the application of failure regions to the software engineering process
was first introduced by Ammann and Knight in their work on data diversity and fault
tolerance. Ammann and Knight's work centered on the use of data redundancy as a
means of ensuring fault tolerance, a fault tolerant strategy that complements design
diversity. The failure domain of the program i.e., the set of input data that causes the
program to fail and its geometry, comprise what Ammann and Knight define as the failure
region. (Ammann and Knight, 1988, pp.418,419)
The success of the data diversity depends on the ability of a reexpression algorithm
to produce data points outside of the failure region, given an initial set of data points
inside of the failure region. The reexpression algorithm transforms an original set of
input data into a new but equivalent set of input data. An input x is provided to a
program P that produces the output P(x). A reexpression algorithm then transforms the
original input x to produce a new input y where y = R(x). Either concurrently or
otherwise, the program P operates on both x and y to produce the output P(x) and P(y).
The reexpression algorithm is considered valid as long as the original information content
is preserved. (Ammann and Knight, 1988, p.419)
Although the initial study on data diversity produced a wide margin of performance,
and empirical results have not conclusively proven the effectiveness of this method,
Ammann and Knight's initial results did show some success and support further research
in the area. Additionally, the proven success of design diversity lends further confidence
to the idea that since diversity in the design space may provide fault tolerance, diversity
in the data space may do the same (Ammann and Knight, 1988, p.418).
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While this research will not involve the specific issue of fault tolerance that
Anmann and Knight explored, manipulation of the input data and examination of failure
regions in the testing process will be the critical aspect of this thesis research.
C. SOFFWARE TESTING
1. General
There has been an extensive amount of research devoted to software testing,
and the significance and importance of testing in the overall software development
process is being recognized as more and more critical. Once considered only a necessary
function testing is now being viewed as more important in reducing future maintenance
costs.
In 1976, Alberts estimated that up to 50% of development cost is incurred
during the testing phase, and as much as 90% of a product's total life-cycle costs involve
maintenance to correct errors and revise the software to meet new requirements (Alberts,
1976). In 1979, Myers estimated that in a typical programming project, approximately
50% of the time and more than 50% of the total costs are devoted to the testing phase
(Myers, 1979, p.vii). Cavano, in his work on high confidence software for the DoD in
1985, suggested that a full 40% of the overall development effort should be devoted to
testing (Cavano, 1985, p.1454).
While the exact figures are not critical, it should be clear that testing is a vital
component of the software development cycle and the product life-cycle. As such, it is
imperative that research on software testing be "put on the front burner" as the critical
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issue facing software development in the 1990's. In this regard, several DoD sponsored
study teams conducted evaluations to determine how the military could improve its
management of computer resources. One of their conclusions was a failure on the part
of the military "to prescribe and adhere to a disciplined hardware and software
development methodology" (Reifer, 1977, p.125). As a result of this study, the DoD
issued a directive to all service components to "develop and implement a (sic) approach
disciplined to the management of software design, engineering and programming which
will ensure the provision of effective software at minimum life-cycle cost" (Reifer, 1977,
p. 125).
2. The Software Development Cycle
One method of determining program correctness and one that propels much
of the software engineering research effort is the concept of program testing. Testing has
been defined as the process of executing a program with the specific intent of finding
errors or faults (Myers, 1979, p.16). A fault is defined as "an accidental condition that
causes a functional unit to fail to perform its required function" (Glossary, 1983). A
good test case has been described as one that has a high probability of detecting errors
(Myers, 1979, p. 16).
The problem is that it is virtually impossible at this point in the evolution of
testing to determine what successful testing is and when it has been achieved. The
difficulty is that in order to be fully confident that testing is complete and successful, it
is necessary to test exhaustively all possible executions of the program with all possible
data inputs. This is difficult in a small program and economically and realistically
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infeasible, if not impossible, for larger programs. It is this inability to test exhaustively
that drives the research in software testing - the analysis of existing testing methods and
the search for better methods.
It is almost universally agreed upon that testing must be viewed as the
destructive process of finding errors and this must be the approach taken into the testing
phase. The testing agency/individual must aggressively approach the testing task with the
goal of discovering errors, not with the goal of showing that the program works correctly.
Bahr points out that prior to the establishment of formal testing methods,
programmers established test data sets in hopes of discovering errors, thereby ensuring
proper program execution for that data considered representative of real system use. This
allowed for the fielding of software systems that contained many undiscovered
performance errors. This also caused many organizations to formalize more aggressive,
multi-dimensional test strategies to test the functional and performance requirements of
the system under test prior to release. (Bahr, 1980, p.21) Many studies comparing test
strategies continue to support the idea that a thorough test plan must encompass multiple
test strategies and not focus on one particular method (Myers, 1979; Bahr, 1980;
Shimeall and Leveson, 1989).
Many software engineers also recommend that all testing be conducted by a
person or persons other than those involved with the design and/or implementation of the
code. It must be an unbiased effort which should not involve egos or personal feelings.
Furthermore, testing must be conducted not only to determine if a program does not do
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what it is supposed to do, but the program must also be tested to ensure that it does what
it is not supposed to do (Myers, 1979, p.7).
The study of failure regions and their application to the testing process is not
without precedent or rationale. The concept of boundary value testing provides anecdotal
evidence that failure regions do not occur randomly and that the evaluation of these input
data sets is critical to the testing process. Boundary value analysis is the evaluation of
test cases that explore the boundary conditions of the program - those conditions directly
on, above, and beneath the edges of the input equivalence and output equivalence classes.
Boundary value analysis is a popular test strategy, applied to both small and large
projects, that relies on selection of specific input data and provides for rapid identification
of data sets or regions that cause a program to execute either correctly or incorrectly.
3. Testing Methods
a. Test Methods Related to Failure Analysis
In his text on software testing techniques, Beizer points out that program
testing comprises half of the development labor required to produce a working program
(Beizer, 1983, p.4). It has become clear, however, that a formal, well-defined test plan
is absolutely essential to make testing an efficient and even workable effort. One
repercussion of a haphazard, nondocumented test plan is that it does not allow for precise,
repetitious testing. Therefore, ad hoc retesting cannot ensure that errors were in fact
corrected. While the value of ad hoc testing cannot be completely dismissed during
debugging, it cannot be substituted for formal, well designed test strategies.
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Other than the realization that formal methods are necessary, there does
not currently exist any single strategy to solve the testing problem. Software testing over
the years has seen a number of different approaches, and several different strategies have
evolved. It is important to note that manipulation of the input data and application of
failure regions to the testing process is not a substitution or replacement for any testing
strategy. Rather it is to be used in conjunction with a formal test plan that uses one or
more of the established test strategies. The ultimate goal of the application of failure
regions is to improve the test plan by eliminating unnecessary test cases and permitting
detection of multiple faults during the formal testing process. Several of these strategies
and their relevance to the concept of failure regions and manipulation of the input data
are discussed below.
(1) Walkthrough Testing
Walkthrough testing is a human testing method which has found to
be effective in detecting logic design and coding errors. In walkthrough testing the test
participants act like computers and mentally execute the program with a small set of test
cases. This small data set allows the testing individuals to implement failure region
analysis on a limited basis while mentally executing the program, especially by applying
boundary value analysis. When faults are discovered with an initial set of data, the tester
can change the input data and determine if the new data set produces the same fault. This
can provide the tester a hasty look at a part of the failure region and may give an indica-
tion of where the program fault is. This simple application of failure region analysis
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during walkthrough testing can make implementation of this human testing process more
efficient.
In 1978, a study conducted by Myers found that from 30% - 70%
of the total faults found in a program were detected by code inspections and walkthroughs
(Myers, 1979, p.19 ). However, it was recognized early that human testing was not nearly
effective enough to be used in isolation. Although the human testing methods are still
employed, they are usually utilized in conjunction with the more traditional computer
based testing techniques (Myers, 1979, p.17).
(2) Mutation Testing
In mutation testing, DeMillo, Lipton, and Sayward utilized a method
known as program mutation in conjunction with the concept of coupling. Coupling
involves the idea that simple errors are coupled to complex errors. The authors describe
it as "the use of test data that distinguishes all programs differing from a correct one by
only simple errors is so sensitive that it also implicitly distinguishes more complex
errors." (DeMillo, Lipton, and Sayward, 1978, p.286) Program mutation is an interactive
testing method that uses a measurement of the number and kinds of errors it is capable
of uncovering as a determinant of the effectiveness of the test data selected.
While this approach was found to be effective in small programs,
as with many other approaches, its utility in a large program is questionable other than
in possibly identifying appropriate test data. It also suffers from the problem of infinity.
The possible number of mutant programs in combination with a variable number of data
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sets can be infinite and will therefore cause the same problem which was encountered
with exhaustive testing - an infinite set of test cases.
Failure regions are just as applicable to mutation testing as they are
to other test strategies. Mutation testing involves manipulation of both the program
source code as well as the input data to evaluate the completeness of the test data. The
use of failure regions affords the opportunity to skip redundant mutations or mutants that
will always produce correct results.
(3) Module Testing
Myers describes module testing as the process of testing the in-
dividual subroutines, packages or procedures in a program rather than testing the program
as a whole. The purpose is to compare the function of a module to the specification of
that module with the intent of showing that the module contradicts the specification. In
module testing, the focus is on testing small blocks of the program. (Myers, 1979, p.77)
Again, module testing is only one aspect of the overall testing
process and must be used in conjunction with other methods. Even if it were possible to
exhaustively test each module, the program cannot be considered completely tested until
it is tested as a whole entity, so that all modules are tested to ensure that all module inter-
faces work correctly.
Module testing makes use of failure region due to its white box
nature. The tester initially derives test data after a review of a module's logic. The test
is then executed on the module as it normally would be. The application of failure
regions then allows the tester to refine the test data and conduct further testing of the
12
module's internal structure. This same process can be applied to each module as well as
the interface between the modules.
(4) Functional and Structural Testing
Functional testing refers to the generation of test data to evaluate
each specified function of the software. It assumes a black box approach in which
implementation details are not important. On the other hand, structural testing is domin-
ated by details. It refers to the generation of test data to evaluate each part of the struc-
ture of the software. While the two strategies differ in both outlook and purpose, there
is no disagreement as to their use. While functional tests can, in theory, detect all errors
in infinite time, structural tests are finite but cannot detect all errors (Beizer, 1983, p.5).
The fact that both strategies have recognized limitations and
advantages allows a tester to incorporate the best of both strategies. Although there have
been numerous studies which support a high error detection rate utilizing structural
testing, there have been no definitive studies that show one method is better than the other
in all situations. In 1976, Hetzel compared the fault detection capabilities of code
reading, structural analysis, and functional testing. In this case the structurc) testing
criterion used was statement coverage. His results showed that functional testing dis-
covered the most faults, code reading discovered the least, and structural testing fell in
between the other two. (Hetzel, 1976) Another study by Basili and Selby compared code
reading by stepwise abstraction with functional and structural testing. The structural
testing criterion used was again statement coverage. While code reading by stepwise
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abstraction detected the most faults, structural testing detected the least number of faults.
(Basili and Selby, 1987)
The key point here is that both of these strategies are relevant to the
study of failure regions in that they both involve the analysis and manipulation of te
input data. The major difference between these two testing strategies is the manner in
which the input data is applied to the programs being tested. The analysis and identifi-
cation of failure regions and their application in either of these strategies should greatly
assist in refining the input data and making the testing more efficient - regardless of
whether the structure of the program is being tested or whether the specified function is
being tested.
(5) Regression Testing
Regression testing is the practice of repeating old tests after a change
in code has been made to correct a fault. The purpose is to determine the effect of the
old data on the corrected code. Additionally, repeated testing with the same data ensures
that new faults have not been added during fault correction. Regression testing is a
process that requires considerable resources. (Lamb, 1988, pp. 116, 117)
The application of failure regions are particularly appropriate to
regression testing. The failure region can be used as a guide in testing the correctness
of the modified code. It also ensures that previous input data is availabie to conduct
regression testing under the same cond ,ions that the initial testing was performed.
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(6) Fault Sensitivity Analysis
Fault sensitivity analysis is "the study of the propensity for a
program to fail in the presence of faults." (Voas and Morell, 1989, p.1) In their work in
the area of fault sensitivity, Voas and Morell formalize the idea that a program has a high
probability of failure upon encountering a fault, that is, if it is difficult to hide a fault in
the code, then the program is fault sensitive (Voas and Morell, 1989, p.1).
This concept of fault sensitivity parallels the study of failure regions.
In their modeling of the process where execution of a fault leads to a failure, Voas and
Morell describe three necessary preconditions: 1) a fault must be reached; 2) the fault
must adversely affect the succeeding data state; 3) that effect must persist to the output
(Voas and Morell, 1989, p.1). These preconditions correspond to the inequalities that
bound the failure region being studied in this research.
Additionally, Voas and Morell assert that infection analysis suggests
that certain locations in the program are fault-sensitive while others are fault-insensitive.
They conclude that a fault-sensitive program requires more test data to ensure program
correctness than a fault-insensitive program. (Voas and Morell, 1989, p. 11) This idea
parallels the idea of error clustering discussed earlier. The difference between fault
sensitivity analysis and failure region analysis is that fault sensitivity analysis analyzes
the program location and the distribution of faults in the code. This thesis analyzes the
conditions for input to reveal faults in the code. While there is some duality in these two
concepts, each application may be of separate usefulness.
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Finally, while it is applicable to several other areas of software
engineering, Voas and Morell's work is also applicable to the area of software testing.
Specifically, they see infection analysis as appropriate to evaluating various test strategies.
Although the infection analysis parallels the failure region analysis, failure region analysis
is designed towards enhancing current testing strategies. Infection analysis can give an
estimate of a program's complexity and, therefore, provide an indication of the test data
adequacy.
b. Benefits of failure region application
The key issue in the previous discussion of the various testing strategies
is that the incorporation of failure regions into those strategies can be highly profitable
to the testing process. The proper application of failure regions allows the tester to avoid
duplicate test cases while proceeding with other more appropriate test cases. This offers
the additional benefit of detection of multiple errors prior to sending the program back
for correction. Another key application is that failure regions can be incorporated with
other conventional test strategies and is not intended to be used in isolation.
D. OVERVIEW
While there has been extensive research in the area of software testing, no testing
methodology exists that ensures program correctness, especially correctness of large
programs. There is a significant amount of current research aimed at examining the input
data and its function in program testing, however, there has been very little research in
the measurement and analysis of failure regions. This first chapter has provided an
16
introduction to the concept of failure regions and a summary of the ongoing research.
The remainder of this thesis research will deal with manipulation of the input data and
measurement and analysis of the shape and geometry of the failure regions.
Chapter II is a detailed description of the thesis methodology. It includes a
description of the programs utilized in this thesis as well as a description of the
specification from which the source programs were derived. Additionally, all assumptions
and preconditions utilized during this research will be explained. The chapter describes
in extreme detail the exact methodology used in manually defining the failure regions.
This will be accomplished through a detailed analysis of the three conditions that define
the failure region and the application of these three conditions to examples from the
source code.
Chapter III is a presentation of the analytic results and a discussion and evaluation
of these results. All observations made in the development of the failure regions will be
presented as well as a discussion of all special cases. These observations are presented
in light of their effect on the software testing process.
This is the focus of Chapter IV - a discussion of areas of potential research and all
other conclusions and recommendations that have been derived from this research effort.
And like previous research on program testing, that is the goal of this research - the
improvement of the software testing process as well as the software development cycle
and a foundation for further research.
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IL METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING THE FAILURE REGION
A. SPECIFICATION AND PROGRAM SOURCE CODE DESCRIPTION
The source code programs analyzed during the course of this research are from a
group of eight programs designed and written by eight pairs of undergraduate students
from the University of California, Irvine. All student groups were provided the
specification of a program called Conflict that simulated combat interaction between two
armies.' The specification required each program to accept global data describing the
position, size, and attributes of each army, plus a description of the terrain in which the
armies conduct operations. A detailed list of the global declarations is depicted in
Appendix A for reference purposes. The programs return a description of the encounters
between the armies, plus the final condition of each army. (Shimeall, PhD Dissertation,
1989)
Each army is composed of one or more battalions, which are made up of one or
more squadrons. The programs are given global data concerning information on the
initial location and attributes of each battalion. Encounters between the opposing armies
are based on the description of their individual battalions as well as the environmental
conditions of weather and terrain. Battalions are able to perform five distinct functions:
attrition, restoration, movement, communication and observation. The conflicts that occur
'In the text of this thesis, bold text refers to the conditions of a failure region, and
italicized text refers to procedures, variables or statements from the source code.
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in this combat simulation result from the interactions each battalion has with every other
battalion in a given number of time intervals based on those five combat operations. The
programs perform input and output only through global data structures. (Shimeall, PhD
Dissertation, 1989)
Although the specification provided more detail than that indicated above, it was
flexible enough so that the eight different versions of the program were varied in length,
organization, structure and linearity. All programs were written in the PASCAL
programming language and compiled using thc UNIX Berkeley compiler. The number
of lines of code in the programs varied from approximately 1,200 to 4,000. A major
requirement was tnat each program had to compile, accept input, execute 15 sets of test
data, and produce output for each input data set before it was accepted. After meeting
these requirements, the number of faults discovered in each program varied from a low
of 25 faults to a high of 50 faults. The variety of the programs in length, structure, and
linearity provided an excellent data base from which to conduct a detailed analysis of
failure regions, although only two of the eight available programs were used in this thesis.
These particular programs were selected because one program had the most source code
faults and the other had the least source code faults of the eight available programs. The
intent was to obtain a somewhat divergent sampling of program quality.
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND PRECONDITIONS
As with any research effort, there were certain assumptions made during the course
of the development of the methodology of defining failure regions. This section points
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out both the general assumptions allowed by this process as well as the more specific
assumptions made concerning the particular programs used. The reader should be aware
that all of the programs described above and utilized in this research meet these
assumptions. The initial assumption regarding failure region analysis is that the program-
iers have conducted some low level testing and thit the program can compile and
execute. As stated above, each program in this research was required to compile and exe-
cute 15 input data sets. This ensured that the programs were at least marginally debugged
by the program team and that the most obvious faults were removed. This is a realistic
assumption since, in a real world software development process, the coding team would
not send a program to the test team until the program compiled and executed at a
minimum. This assumption, however, does not imply any degree of software reliability,
either in a research or real world scenario.
It is assumed that acceptable and unacceptable output has been established prior to
program testing. The establishment of acceptable output is necessary so that correct
program behavior can be determined upon program execution. Additionally, when
determining the conditions under which bad data is not masked (Condition III), it is
necessary to know what is acceptable/unacceptable output so that it can be determined if
output from the test runs is contaminated. This will have a significant impact on
Condition MI of the failure region. Furthermore, programs can be of any size and struc-
ture, although it will be shown later that structure has a significant impact on the level
of difficulty of this process.
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It is assumed that prior to the failure region analysis, the program has been tested
using some formal test strategy. This supports a basic tenet of this research - failure
region analysis is not designed to circumvent or replace testing efforts. Rather, it is
designed to enhance the testing process through the refinement of test data. Once this test
strategy has been implemented and faults have been identified and located, although not
necessarily corrected, the failure region analysis can proceed. In this research, all
programs were tested and faults were located using a variety of test techniques such as
inspection, static analysis, code reading, etc. This also points out that the specific test
technique used is not vital to the failure region analysis. The only consideration is that
faults are identified.
It is assumed that uninitialized values are contaminated and, therefore, coincidental
correctness does not occur. While this is in general difficult to support, as there are
published accounts of correct behavior of uninitialized variables, this assumption obviates
the need for very complex probabilistic arguments in the construction of failure regions.
(Shimeall and Leveson, 1989, pp. 35, 37). This will be critical in establishing the
conditions under which bad data values are not masked when defining the failure region.
A further assumption is that uninitialized, improperly assigned, or improperly referenced
pointers will be categorized and treated like uninitialized values - they are contaminated
and are not assumed coincidentally correct.
It is assumed that during the process of developing the conditions that define the
failure region, faults must be examined in isolation. This means that the conditions for
each fault are developed without regard to other faults. This assumes that faulty code
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does not have any affect on the conditions that define the failure region for another fault.
This assumption exists strictly to simplify the analysis presented in this thesis and future
work may involve setting it aside.
Finally, the failure regions presented throughout the course of this paper represent
the unsimplified failure region. That is, the failure regions are not simplified to a reduced
state. In an actual scenario, conditions AND'ed and OR'ed together would be logically
simplified to their simplest state. Logical reduction or simplification is not done in this
paper so that the failure region can be seen in its most complete state.
C. MANUAL METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING FAILURE REGIONS
1. General
The process of manually analyzing failure regions is not a particularly complex
one, but it is labor intensive and time consuming, and it requires an in-depth knowledge
of the source code. The goal of the failure region analysis is to make testing a more
efficient process. At this early stage in the development of this manual process, the
failure region analysis can improve the testing process but the advantage gained is offset
by the time required to perform the analysis. To do this will require further refinement
of the manual process and/or the automation of this process (Shimeall, FALTER,
September 1989 and Shimeall, REACHER, September 1989).
Failure regions are bounded by the inequalities deriving the combination of
three sources the reachability conditions for the code with the defect (Condition I); the
conditions under which the calculations in that code produce an erroneous value
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(Condition II); and the conditions under which the bad data isn't masked by later
processing (Condition HI) (Shimeall and Griffin, 1989, p.1). The logical AND of these
three conditions derives the failure region. The absence of any or all of the three
conditions implies a TRUE condition. This means that there is nothing in that condition
that puts a limit on the failure region or nothing that precludes identification of the failure
region. If any of these conditions prove impossible, the fault being analyzed will not
cause a failure unless there is a change in the source code. The remainder of this chapter
will be devoted to a detailed development of each of the three conditions that combine
to form a failure region.
2. Development of the Reachability Conditions (Condition I)
The reachability conditions for a fault refer to the set of conditions that allow
the error producing code to be executed. The development of the reachability conditions
for a particular fault is a matter of code reading. By necessity this step must begin at the
start of the program. The goal is to identify all of those conditions that must be satisfied
in order for the code with the defect to be reached. In order to accomplish this, the
problem can be attacked in two phases. These two phases can be identified as the
external reachability conditions and the internal reachability conditions. In the first or
external phase, those conditions that are external to the procedure/function in which the
fault occurs are established. In the second or internal phase, those conditions that are
internal to the procedure/function in which the fault occurs are identified. Therefore, a
failure region can have both external and internal reachability conditions, and the logical
AND of these two sets forms the complete reachability condition.
23
To establish the external conditions, it is necessary to start at the beginning of
the program. Appendix B is a segment of source code, the main procedure and two
internal procedures taken from test program six to illustrate this process. This particular
code has three identified faults, all in procedure litnBanalion: the first is located in the
highlighted area between lines 30 and 31; the second fault is in the highlighted area
between lines 52 and 53; and the third fault is located in the highlighted area between
lines 54 and 55.
In this section of code, the main procedure, Conflict, first calls procedure
Initialize which initializes the values of the OldArmy. The first line in this procedure
does a check on the value of Duration. If the value of Duration is either negative or zero
(Duration <= 0), the program will abort and produce an error message. Therefore, a
reachability condition for any faults occurring later in the program and specifically for the
three faults that occur in procedure InitBattalion is (Duration > 0). Additionally, lines
099 through 110, depicted in Figure 2.1, are a series of checks to ensure that initialized
variables are within acceptable ranges. If any of these variables fall outside of their
acceptable ranges, the program will produce an error message and terminate. Therefore,
the following reachability conditions are established by the checks in Figure 2.1:
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099 if (NumWTypes < 0) or (NumWTypes > MaxWType) then
100 TellError ('NumWTypes is out of possible range');
101 if XDelta <= 0 then
102 TellError ('XDelta is not greater than zero');
103 if YDelta <= 0 then
104 TellError ('YDelta is not greater than zero');
105 if (NumWEvents < 0) or (NumWEvents > MaxWeather) then
106 TellError ('NumWEvents is out of possible range');
107 if SampleRate < 0 then
108 TellError ('SampleRate is negative');
109 if IMeanAlt <= 0 then
110 TellError ('IMeanAlt is not positive');
Figure 2.1 Range Checks on Initialized Variables











Lines 112 through 120 depicted in Figure 2.2 also establish a distinct set of reachability
conditions that must be satisfied before the program can proceed. These conditions may











112 for WEvent 1= to Params.NumWEvents do
113 with WeatherliWEvent] do
114 begin
115 if TStart > TEnd then
116 TellError ('Bad starting and ending time for weather event');
117 if WRadius <= 0 then
118 TellError ('Bad radius for weather event');
119 if WSeverity > Params.WMaxSeverity then
120 TellError ('WEvent Severity > Params.
WMaxSeverity');
Figure 2.2 Requirements Defining the Reachability Conditions
Finally, lines 122 and 123 shown below also establish yet another set of reachability
conditions that must be satisfied.
122 for Side :=false to true do
123 for Batt := I to NArmy[SideJ do
These conditions can be expressed in the following terms:
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((Side e [true] I NArmy[true] > 0)
AND
(Batt e [1..NArmy[trueJ]))
The logical AND of the above conditions are summarized in Figure 2.3 and establish the
external reachability conditions for the three faults in Appendix B.
Now that all external conditions have been satisfied, the conditions internal to
the function/procedure in which the fault occurs must be checked. In this case, the three
faults are located in procedure Initialize, the procedure which checks for input correctness.
Again, it is necessary to identify all of those conditions that must occur in order for the
program to reach line 30, the last line of code prior to the location of the first fault. The
first check is at line 21 and involves the line of code:
021 for WeaponType := I to Parans.NunWTypes do
Obviously, WeaponType must be greater than 0 and less than or equal to
Paramsu.NwnWTypes. Therefore, the reachability condition for fault number one also
includes the internal conditions:
((WeaponType c [1 ... Parans.NumWTypes]) and (Params.NumWTypes > 0))
Since there are no other internal conditions that must be established in order to reach the
faulty code, these conditions must be logically AND'ed with the external conditional
requirements established earlier. As a result, the complete reachability conditions for the






























((Side e [true] I NArmy[true] > 0)
AND
(Batt £ [1..NArmy[true])))





























Figure 2.4 Reachability Conditions (Condition 1)
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The next fault, located immediately after line 52, presents a different situation.
The external requirements exist just as they did for the first fault. Obviously, this must
hold true in order for the procedure InitBattalion to be executed. However, in this case,
there are no other conditional statements that affect the execution of the faulty code. As
a result, the only conditions that must be established and the complete reachability
conditions for fault number two are again depicted in Figure 2.3.
The same situation exists for fault number three. The external requirements
still exist, but there are no other conditions that must be met in order for the faulty code
to be reached. Therefore, the internal reachability condition is TRUE, and once again,
the only reachability conditions for fault number three are the external reachability
conditions depicted in Figure 2.3.
This same process will establish the reachability conditions for any faults
located and identified in the source code. Again, the key point in this stage of the
process is to identify those conditions in the source code prior to the faulty code that must
be met in order for the faulty code to be executed. The logical AND of these conditions
is the reachability condition (Condition I) for the failure region for that particular fault.
3. Development of the Error Generation Conditions (Condition H)
The error generation conditions (Condition II) are those specific conditions that
cause the fault to be executed in a way that an erroneous intermediate result or error is
produced. If the error is generated under all conditions, or rather, the error will be
generated every time the code is reached, then the error generation condition is TRUE.
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If the error cannot be generated, the error generation condition is FALSE and the failure
region analysis ceases.
The source code in Appendix C will be used to demonstrate the development
of the error generation condition. In this particular code, the first fault, located
immediately after line four, is a missing check on the value of OldArmy[DestArmy,
Dest].Squadrons, i.e. a piece of missing code. In this case, as long as OldArmy[Dest-
Army, Dest].Squadrons > 0, there is no fault. However, if this value is less than or equal
to 0, incorrect operations may be performed on destroyed battalions. Therefore, the error
generation condition for this fault is:
(OldArmy[DestArmy, Dest].Squadrons <= 0)
The next fault is located immediately after line five and involves the incorrect
use of the variable CommandsFinished.msg. The correct code and incorrect code are
shown in Figure 2.5. In this example, the fault will not generate an error as long as
CommandsFinishedA msg = Cmsgs[DestArmy, msgJ.msg. Conversely, the fault will
generate an error whenever CommandsFinished.msg <> Cmsgs[DestArmy, msgJ.msg.
Therefore, the error generation condition for this fault is:
(Cmsgs[DestArmy, msgl.msg <> CommandsFinishedA.msg)
The final fault in this code segment is located immediately after line 14. The
fault in this case is that NewArmy is not updated to match OldArmy after command
messages are implemented. This fault is similar to the first fault explained for the error
generation conditions, that is, it involves a missing piece of code:




Army[DestArmy, Dest] := Cmsgs [DestArmy, msgl.msg;
a) Correct code
CheckBattalionConstants (msg, Params.NumWTypes);
Army[DestArmy, Dest] := msg;
b) Incorrect code
Figure 2.5 Source Code Example
This fault will occur every time that it is reached, therefore, the error generation condition
for this fault will again be TRUE.
The three examples presented above represent the error generation conditions
(Condition II) for three distinct faults. To define their respective failure regions, these
conditions must be logically AND'ed with their respective reachability conditions
(Condition I) and the conditions under which the errors are not masked by later
processing (Condition III).
4. Development of the Conditions Under Which the Fault Is Not Masked
(Condition Ill)
The conditions under which a bad value or values are not masked by later
processing define the third boundary of the failure region (Condition III). Again in this
case, it is necessary to know the exact location of the fault in the source code. Once the
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fault is identified and located and the two previous conditions are established, the next
step is to determine the conditions under which the bad data cannot be masked by further
processing. This is done by determining what the contaminated data is and determining
where and how the bad data is next used. This must be done until the data is used to
generate output to determine whether or not the bad data is masked prior to program
output. In the example programs utilized in this research, the only output occurs at the
completion of program execution. It appears the easiest way to do this is to determine
all of the conditions that may cause the bad data to be masked and then negate these
conditions. The two ways in which a bad value is masked by further processing are: a)
the bad data can be overwritten by an acceptable data value; or b) the bad data never
contributes to the final result.
The source code in Appendix D will be used to demonstrate the development
of Condition III. Again, when establishing the failure region, Condition I and Condition
II should be resolved prior to determining Condition Il. Also, as in developing the
reachability conditions, there are both internal and external conditions that must be
satisfied. The main task in developing Condition III is to trace the program from the fault
and determine what variables become contaminated and how these variables affect the
output. In the case of the fault in Appendix D, the result of the fault is the contamination
of the variable Restoration[Sqd, O] in line ten. This condition is also internal to the
procedure in which the error occurs. Examining the source code we observe that the
variable Restoration[Sqd, 01 is assigned inside of the for loop starting at line seven:
for Sqd := 1 to ArmylArmynumfBatt].Squadrons do
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Since the assignment statement is inside of a loop, this should be a flag indicating that
it is possible that either a good or bad value of Restoration[Sqd, 0] could be overwritten
by another value during later processing. Therefore, the internal conditions under which
a bad value of Restoration[Sqd, 01 could be overwritten and masked are:




(min (min (FixRate * NumFixers/Casualties, FixSuppl/Casualties)),
EnduranceO[Sqd] - Endurance[Sqd]) <= Restoration[Sqd, 0]
This equation translates into some later value of s which allows a good value of
Restoration[Sqd, 01 to overwrite and mask a bad value. This condition must then be
negated to arrive at the true conditions that do not allow a value to be masked by later
processing (Condition III).
5. Example of Defining the Entire Failure Region
The preceding sections have provided the details as how to specifically define
each individual condition of the failure region. The following example is a summary of
those examples and will provide an example of defining all three failure region conditions
for a single fault. The source code in Appendix E will be used for this example.
This particular code segment involves the main procedure of Conflict and one
sub procedure (InitVals). The fault occurs immediately after line 32. The fault is that the
initial Velocity is assigned incorrectly in line 33 if Endurance <= 0. Since InjiVals is the
first procedure called and it is also the first line in the main procedure, there are no
external conditions that must be satisfied before InitVals is reached. The next step is to
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determine the internal reachability conditions. The conditionals in the statements below
include the code where the fault occurs and are good candidates for reachability
conditions.
003 for ArmyNwn := false to true do
004 for Batt := I to NArmy[ArmyNum] do
031 for Sqd := 1 to Army[ArmyNum][BattJ.Squadrons do
After fther analysis, these 'for' statements produce the internal reachability conditions
depicted in Figure 2.6 which must be satisfied before the faulty code is reached. Since
there are no external conditions, Figure 2.6 also represents the complete reachability
conditions for the fault.
((ArrnyNum E [true] I NArmy[true] > 0)
AND(Batt E [1..NArmy [true]]))
AND




((Sqd e [1 ..Army[ArmyNum] [Batt] .Squadrons])
AND
(Army[ArmyNum][Batt].Squadrons > 0))
Figure 2.6 Internal Reachability Conditions
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The error generation conditions (Condition II) for this fault occur when
Army[ArmyNwn][BattJ.Endurance[SqdJ <= 0 and when this velocity (VO) is less than





where y e [x] I x = 9999 OR
(3 (s) I 1 <= s <= Sqd - 1),
x = Army[ArmyNum][BattJ.VO[s]}
The final conditions of the failure region are established by determining the
conditions under which a bad value for Velocity cannot be masked. This happens
internally in InitVals when a subsequently good value of VO[SqdJ overwrites a bad value
in lines 30 - 32. This derives the following internal conditions under which a bad value
cannot be masked by further processing (Condition Ill):





The external conditions are those non-masking conditions external to the procedure that
contains the fault. In this case, although the contamination of the variable Velocity in line
33 causes the contamination of several other variables in external procedures, there are
no further external conditions under which the value of Velocity is not masked by later
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processing. Thus, the failure region is defined by the logical AND of the three sets of
conditions (Condition I, II, and Il) just specified and is shown in Figure 2.7.
D. CONCLUSION
This chapter has provided a detailed look at the process of manually developing and
the three conditions that define software failure regions. Additionally, Appendix F
contains a list of the failure regions analyzed in this study. While this chapter has
provided an examination of how the process works, the next chapter is an analysis of that



















where y e [x] I x = 9999 OR
3 (s) I I <= s <= Sqd - 1,
x = Army[ArmyNum][Batt].VO[s] }
(Condition I)





Figure 2.7 The Complete Failure Region
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11. OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
The goal of identifying the failure region for a detected fault is to determine which
further input data test cases fall within the failure region. Those recognizably redundant
test cases may be set aside and testing may proceed with the remaining test cases. After
fault correction the failure regions can be used as a guide in testing the corrections to the
code (Shimeall and Griffin, 1989, pp. 1,2). This chapter presents observations about the
failure region analysis process and about the individual failure regions. It is quite
possible that some of these ideas may be profitable in the automation of this process or
in other testing research.
This research is explorative in that it is the first in-depth look at the manual analysis
for software failure regions. This study was primarily devoted to the development and
understanding of the failure region analysis process itself. It is anticipated that future
work will empirically explore characteristics of the regions and the information they yield
about faults in computer software. While satisfying the primary goal some interesting
factors of the failure regions were observed, and these factors are also described in this
chapter. However, most of the observations will focus on the process of failure region
analysis. To focus the development of failure region analysis, this research was
conducted using a single application. That is, the research data base was a single
program specification and a set of two programs built according to that single
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specification. While it is believed that these observations are applicable in a larger
context, that belief is not yet supported empirically. As such, the reader is urged to use
caution in applying the results below to different applications.
During the process of manually developing the failure region, it is necessary to view
each fault in isolation. This means that the conditions for each failure region determined
from the code in its uncorrected form. The analysis of this process should not attempt
to alter any conditions of that region based on a perception of another fault, a fault
correction, or another failure region. This is because this effort is not a debugging
process - it is a means of reducing test effort by determining redundant test data. Failure
region analysis makes no assumptions about how faults may be corrected, and faults do
not need to be corrected prior to analyzing for failure regions.
B. OBSERVATIONS
1. FAILURE REGION OBSERVATIONS
By definition, a failure region consists of the logical AND of three distinct
subregions, and it is precisely these three conditions that must occur in order for the fault
to be reached, the error to be generated, and the bad data to be carried through to the
output. If the input data varies from any of the three conditions of the failure region, then
the failure region will be negated because one of the following three things will occur:
a) the fault will not be reached; b) the error will not be generated; c) the bad data will
be masked prior to program output or will not contribute to the final output. Therefore,
it is only the three precise conditions of the failure region for a specific fault that will
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allow that fault to occur. Any variance of these conditions will either cause a different
error to occur or will cause no error.
One observation that can be made about the software failure regions examined
in this research is that the failure regions tend to consist of disjoint subregions. That is,
individual failure regions generally consist of distinct conditions that delimit disjoint
portions of the data input space. While there may be some overlap, this was the
exception rather than the rule.
The geometry of failure regions supports the concept that software failure
regions may contribute to a more efficient testing process by removing redundant test
cases. Since the sub regions tend to be disjoint and often in non-trivial ways, each failure
region defined may identify subtly related portions of the input data space that can be
eliminated in future test cases until faults are corrected. The size of the failure region and
its subregions is not normally a function of program size, but more a function of the
number of variables in its boundary conditions.
A significant effort was made in trying to draw some conclusions about the
geometry of a failure region based on the type of error, i.e. infinite loops, initialization
faults, etc. While it may be possible to draw some conclusions about how a certain type
of error affects an individual region boundary condition, the fact that each failure region
is delimited by three separate and distinct conditions makes generalizing about the overall
failure region virtually impossible at this point. One general observation is that the type
of error does seem to have an impact on the error generation condition (Condition H),
however, trying to draw more precise conclusions about this idea is premature at this
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point. It is hoped that further research using a broader failure region data base will permit
general observations about the overall shape of the regions based simply on error type.
2. PROCESS OBSERVATIONS
a. General
The manual process of defining software failure regions is not particularly
difficult to comprehend, however, it is a time-consuming and laborious procedure to
implement. The level of difficulty is dependent on both the length of the program and its
components as well as the program complexity. This process is much easier to apply to
a linear, non-nested program. In the case of a nested program, establishing the three
failure region conditions becomes increasingly difficult as the nesting increases. In the
case of the Pascal programming language, the conditionals if ..then, if...then...else,for...do,
while.. .do, repeat.. .until, case...of establish the program nesting that increases the difficulty
of defining the failure regions. Planned automation of the region analysis process should
alleviate much of this difficulty.
b. Comparative Difficulty of Determining Failure Region Conditions
Beginning with the most obvious findings, the first result that became
clear during the course of analyzing for the failure regions was the comparative difficulty
or ease of determining the various conditions of the failure region. It quickly became
apparent that establishing the reachability and error generation conditions was the easiest
portion of the analysis. As explained in the previous chapter, establishing the reachability
conditions is simply a matter of determining what conditional statements contain the
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erroneous code and then determining what conditions allow that code to be reached.
Those conditional statements that do not affect the erroneous code do not even need to
be considered. This code reading approach is quite simple and does not present any
unusual problems in the identification of the reachability conditions.
Also, the identification of reachability conditions for one fault will
frequently assist in determining the reachability conditions for another fault. This is
particularly true when the faults are located in close proximity to each other or lie along
the same paths. Figure 3.1, extracted from Appendix D, is the main procedure from
source program number three and provides a good example of this situation. Lines '1
and 12 are pieces of code that were missing from the original source code. The original
error is an inaccurate assumption that Duration = 0 is an erroneous value. Therefore, the
condition Duration >= 0 becomes a reachability condition for any fault that occurs later
in the program and must be included as a reachability condition in all other failure
regions.
The error generation condition is also a fairly easy condition to establish
in terms of relative difficulty. Once the fault is identified, establishing Condition II
conditions is simply a matter of determining the specific conditions that cause the error
to occur. Since it doesn't involve tracing through the program source code, it can
frequently be easier to determine than the reachability conditions (Condition I). Again,
as stated earlier, it is not actually necessary to distinguish between Condition I and II
conditions when the distinction is vague. This holds true as long as the condition is




003 if Duration > 0 then







011 if Duration = 0 then
012 Output(0)
013 else
014 TellError ('Invalid Duration value');
015 end; (Conflict)
Figure 3.1 Example of Duplication of Reachability Conditions
a complete statement of the conditions that lead to an error being generated by a fault in
the program source code.
The establishment of the conditions in which the bad values resulting
from a fault aren't masked by later processing is by far the most difficult to establish.
These conditions have both an internal and external dimension. Additionally, the program
must be traced through from the occurrence of the error to the point in the program where
the contaminated data may be output. While one variable may be contaminated initially,
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this variable can contaminate many other variables. These other contaminated variables
must be traced through to program output. As the contaminated variables are traced, all
masking conditions must be established and then negated to determine the Condition III
conditions. In the case of a large program and significant variable contamination, this can
be a very time consuming and difficult process.
In the course of this study, for the average failure region, the
establishment of Condition I required approximately 35% of the time, Condition II
required approximately 15% of the time, and Condition III required approximately 50%
of the total time. The reader is cautioned that these figures are both relative and
approximate. Also, this study started after all of the faults were identified. The time
required to identify and localize a fault in a program may add substantially to the time
required to establish Condition H. However, localizing and identifying faults is a required
part of normal development and this work assumes that it has been completed prior to
starting the failure region analysis process.
c. Common Causes for Generating TRUE Conditions
There are several situations that exist within the program source code that
allow general statements to be made about the conditions of a failure region. These are
situations that cause a specific condition of the failure region to be TRUE. These special
circumstances dictate that: a) a fault will always be reached or; b) an error will always
be generated or, c) there are no conditions in which the bad value is not masked by later
processing. A short description of each of the situations and how they apply to the failure
region conditions is provided below.
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(1) Error Reachability Conditions
If there are not any conditionals that affect the erroneous code, i.e.
there are no conditions affecting the reachability of the erroneous code, then the
reachability condition will always be TRUE. This means that there must not be any
if.then, if..then...else, for...do, while...do, repeat...until, CASE...of statements anywhere
in the flow of execution prior to the occurrence of the fault that prevent the execution of
the erroneous code. This must hold true both internally and externally, that is, in both
the procedure/function in which the fault occurs and in the other procedure/functions that
were executed previously.
(2) Error Generation Conditions
The situations in which the error generation condition will always
be TRUE, i.e. the error will always occur, are more difficult to make general conclusions
about. Generally, the error generation conditions will be TRUE under all circumstances
except in those cases where the erroneous code involves a decision that allows the source
code to behave in more than one way or when there has been an incorrect substitution of
one variable or constant for another variable or constant. The first situation usually
involves the reserved words AND, OR, if.. .then, if..then...else, etc that cause a program
to do one thing under certain conditions and something else under a different set of
conditions. The second situation involves a mistaken substitution of variables or
constants. This is particularly true in the case of calculation or assignment statements and
equality/inequality statements.
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(3) Conditions Under Which a Bad Value Isn't Masked by Later
Processing
The situations that cause Condition LIU to be TRUE are when there
are no specific conditions that do not allow a bad value to be masked by later processing.
This occurs whenever there are no conditions that allow a bad value to be masked after
the occurrence of the error. While it is difficult to make general statements about the
circumstances that always cause Condition III to be TRUE, Condition III will always be
TRUE whenever the program terminates prematurely. This is the most common situation
under which Condition III will always be TRUE. An example of this situation would be
in the case of a divide by zero error that causes the program to terminate. This will
generate a TRUE condition in all cases. Another general situation that generates a
TRUE condition is when faults occur in the generation of the output. This too will
always cause a TRUE condition.
d. Common Ground Between Failure Region Conditions
As explained in Chapter II, both Condition I and Condition III conditions
have an internal and external aspect. The internal aspect refers to the procedure/function
in which the erroneous code is located while the external aspect refers to those
procedures/functions outside of the ones that contain the erroneous code. This can have
significant repercussions since the external conditions can and generally will impact on
both the size and dimensions of the failure regions.
The fact that Condition I and Condition III conditions have an internal
and external aspect offers an interesting sidelight. As has been pointed out earlier, the
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development of the Condition III external conditions is the most difficult and time
consuming part of this process. It may be possible to speed this process by examining
the complete conditions for Conditions I and II and only the internal conditions for
Condition III. Prior to this being done, however, more research needs to be done in order
to determine the extent of the data input being reduced by each condition. In terms of
relative time required to establish Condition I, establishing the external reachability
conditions takes approximately 70% of the total effort as opposed to 30% to establish the
internal conditions. In regards to Condition III, establishing the external conditions takes
approximately 75% of the time while establishing the internal conditions takes only about
25% of the time. These relative times can only be approximations since program length,
organization, and complexity can also significantly impact the establishment of the failure
region conditions. It is conceivable that significant portions of the input data space can
be reduced by looking selectively at parts of the failure region while reducing the time
that this manual process actually takes.
During manual analysis, we often found that the distinction between
whether a condition is a reachability condition (Condition I) or an error generation
condition (Condition II) can be ambiguous. The distinction between an error generation
condition (Condition II) and the condition under which a bad value cannot be masked by
further processing can be equally vague. In the manual process, it is not crucial to make
this distinction as long as the ambiguous condition(s) is addressed in the failure region
under one of the conditions. However, this also suggests that the conditions that are
being used to define the failure region may not be completely appropriate. Since there
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is overlap between Condition I and Condition 11 and between Condition II and Condition
I, it may be possible that we need to reexamine the basic definition of a failure region
in terms of the three conditions. In other words, this ambiguity suggests that future
research may find other ways of defining a failure region.
e. Variable Contamination
The contamination of variables is another significant aspect of this
process. A variable is considered contaminated when it is modified by the erroneous code
or uses a result of the erroneous code. While this is certainly source code dependent,
variable contamination in the programs utilized during the course of this research
propagated rapidly (certainly a relative term that is difficult to define with such a limited
empirical base). In one case, a single contaminated variable caused the subsequent
contamination of ten other variables in subsequent procedures. This affects the analysis
of the conditions in which a bad value isn't masked by later processing. Since it is
necessary to trace the contaminated variables through until either they are overwritten or
output, the level of contamination is a considerable factor. However, while variable
contamination was considered high during this process, this contamination was generally
vertical as opposed to horizontal. That is, variables generally contaminated other variables
in a linear fashion one after another as opposed to the contamination of several variables
in a tree-like fashion. This is important because it tends to limit the number of variables
that need to be traced through the program at exactly the same time. A vertical
contamination also tends to produce a failure region that is smaller in size and dimension
than a horizontal contamination.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In addition to increasing the efficiency of testing, the process of analysis for failure
regions provides several advantages during software development. The analysis of failure
regions provides some detailed information about the source code. It provides a detailed
look at the organization and structure, complexity, and flow of the program.
In particular, the process highlights the connections between various variables in the
program and the propagation of their values. This may suggest useful ways that the
program may check its internal state during execution. It also offers a closeup view of the
program faults - where they occur, along what paths they occur, and possibly some ideas
on the clustering of faults in the source code. If rewrites are needed, the localization of
faults provides a basis for making intelligent decisions based on where the efforts are best
spent.
Furthermore, failure region analysis also gives information about the application
requirements. The failure region process requires a closeup analysis of the input data.
This analysis allows the user to compare data values to the requirements and analyze
consistency between the requirements and the actual code. This is particularly true in the
case of data boundary conditions.
Failure region analysis provides the tester with information about the testing
process. In particular, failure region analysis provides a means of differentiating between
anomalies and faults detected by previous testing techniques. Anomalies are abnormal
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constructs detected by either manual or automated static analysis techniques. These
abnormal constructs may either be faults or constructs that cause either intentional or
unintentional side effects. Failure region analysis may bt used to determine if an
anomaly is a fault. As pointed out earlier, this process also provides a means of guiding
regression testing to make regression testing a more efficient process. Finally, failure
region analysis provides the tester feedback on the quality of the input data selected to
be part of the input data test set.
One factor that may reduce the cost of the failure region analysis process is its
cross-application with other testing techniques. The manual failure region process as
defined herein requires a detailed analysis of the source code. As such, it is possible that
it could be used in conjunction with other techniques that require a similar analysis. For
example, reachability analysis is part of structural testing and error generation analysis
is part of code inspections or code reading. It is quite possible that each of these
processes and others not specified here could be used in conjunction with each other,
thereby gaining the benefits of each process while minimizing the costs.
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has been the first in-depth examination of the manual development of
software failure regions. The observations and findings presented in the previous chapters
provide initial basic knowledge about the process. As pointed out in Chapter III, there
are limitations on this research. Despite these limitations, it has provided an excellent
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basis from which some guardedly general conclusions can be drawn and it is an ideal
source for future research topics.
While this research has identified the difficulty of implementing this process as a
manual tool, the automation of this process will significantly enhance the testing process.
It will make initial testing more efficient, and it will also improve the process of
regression testing. However, even when this process becomes fully automated, the
problem of manipulating and statistically analyzing multi-dimensional failure regions must
be solved. This involves improvements in theoretical understanding of the relationships
between n-dimensional objects and is the subject of ongoing research.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several areas of research that are logical follow-ups to this work. Several
of these involve the idea of statistical analysis of the failure regions. The first area that
needs to be addressed before this concept can be utilized profitably is the capability to
statistically analyze multi-dimensional failure regions. A critical aspect of this idea is the
ability to be able to graph these regions and draw conclusions about the shape and
geometry of the software failure regions. The ability to do statistical analysis on the
failure regions may provide information on the clustering of failure regions. Another
aspect of this statistical analysis is the ability to determine the size of the failure regions
relative to the total data input space. This will allow the testers to derive a mathematical
estimate of the percent of the data input space that can be eliminated from further testing.
Another beneficial aspect of the statistical analysis is the ability to be able to determine
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how much each condition of the failure region contributes to the overall reduction of test
cases.
There are several other areas of potential research that involve software failure
region analysis. The idea of applying failure region analysis earlier in the software
engineering life cycle process is an open question. It is entirely feasible that failure
region analysis can be applied during the development of the requirements and design
as a means of reviewing the consistency, sufficiency, feasibility and testability of the
system during development.
Another area of potential research is the examination of the estimation of cost of
error correction. This is the process of estimating the expense of correcting faults in the
source code that result in errors. Empirical data must be developed to determine if the
cost of error correction is greater than the benefit derived and how this cost factor is
influenced by the number, size and dimensions of the subregions. It may be determined
that in some cases the cost of error correction outweighs the benefits of fixing the fault,
therefore, the fault is identified and commented but not corrected.
This study was based entirely on a data base that executed numerical data input.
Further study is needed to determine the feasibility of applying the failure region analysis
to programs that execute non-numeric input data. While it is believed that this process
is applicable to this type of program, this has not been established empirically.
Additionally, more research is needed to determine the applicability of this process to
other applications. One particular example is the application of this process to
production-quality code. Empirical data is needed to determine if this process is easier
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if applied to well tested code or more difficult. It would be expected that unit tested, non
production-quality code would contain more faults and failure regions, while the faults
in production-quality code would be more subtle. While the subtlety of the faults will
have a greater impact on the fault detection technique used in the testing process, further
research is needed to determine if the geometry of a failure region differs between
production and non production-quality code.
Finally, further study must be done to establish the limitations of this process. Of
particular concern is the derivation of the external conditions of Condition I and
Condition III in large programs. As a result of this study, it is recognized that this
process certainly becomes more difficult as program size increases. However, the rate
of increase of effort still needs to be established empirically.
The analysis of software failure regions is a relatively new field of study, and there
are many open questions. This research has established some initial observations,
however, it has opened up many more questions to be explored in the near future.
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APPENDIX A
This Appendix lists all of the global PASCAL declarations utilized in the source code. These terms are









Results = (None, Observed, Engaged);









TStart, TEnd : INTEGER;
WXO, WYO, dWX, dWY : REAL;
WRadius, WSeverity : REAL;
END;
PRec = RECORD
ISlopeFactor, IAltFactor, IMeanAlt, IX, IY, IC : REAL;
NumWTypes: INTEGER;










CommJamPriority: ARRAY [1..MaxBattalion] OF INTEGER;














ObsMinAngle : ARRAY [1..MaxSquadron] OF REAL;







SquadIntensity : ARRAY [1..MaxSquadron) OF INTEGER;
SquadLength : REAL;
Squadrons: INTEGER;
SquadSep, RowSep : REAL;
SquadWidth : REAL;
Theta : REAL;
VO : ARRAY [1 ..MaxSquadron] OF REAL:
VWEffect : REAL;
Weapon: ARRAY [1..MaxWType] OF WRec;
WeapPriority : ARRAY [1..MaxBattalion] OF ARRAY [l..MaxWType] OF INTEGER;
WeapSensitivity : ARRAY [..MaxWType] OF REAL;
Wear: ARRAY [1..MaxSquadronl OF REAL;











VAR Army : Array [BOOLEAN] OF ARRAY [1..MaxBattalion] OF Battalion;
NArny : ARRAY [BOOLEAN] OF INTEGER;
Terrain: ARRAY [0..MaxTerrain, O..MaxTerrain] OF INTEGER;
Weather: ARRAY [1..MaxWeather] of WEvent;
Cmsgs : ARRAY [BOOLEAN] OF ARRAY [1..MaxMsg] OF ComMsg;
NCmsgs : Array [BOOLEAN] OF INTEGER;
Duration: INTEGER;
Params : PRec;
Location: ARRAY [BOOLEAN] OF ARRAY [l..MaxBattalion] OF
RECORD
X, Y : REAL;
W, H : REAL;
END;






Action: ARRAY [BOOLEAN] OF
RECORD




The following is an extract of source code from test program six. The original source code lines are
numbered. The unnumbered lines within the starred lines are annotated with the appropriate fault number,





var Squad, Squadl, WeaponType, Weapon ; integer,
LocatIntensity ; real;
001 begin (InitBattalion)
002 with Army[IArmy, IBatt] do
003 AlignSquads(lArmy, IBatt, Squadrons, X, Y, OldArmy
[IArmy,IBatt].SquadArray);
004 SqdI := 1;
005 for Squad := I to Army[IArmy, IBatt].Squadrons do
006 with OldArmylArmy, lBatt).SquadArray[Sqdlj do
007 begin
008 Armylndex := Squad;
009 dKilled := 0;
010 Fixing := 0;
Oil if Army(IArmy, IBatt].Endurance[SquadI < 0 then
012 TellError ('Negative endurance when initializing battalion')
013 else
014 if Army[IArmy, IBatt].Endurance[Squad] > 0 then
015 begin
016 Endurance := Army[IArmy, Batt].Endurance[Sqd];
17 Sqdl := Sqdl + 1;
018 end;
019 Status := Functional;
020 end;
021 for WeaponType := I to Params.NumWTypes do
022 with OldArmy[IArmy, IBaU].Weapons[WeaponType] do
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023 begin
024 if Army[IArmy,IBatt].Weapon[WeaponType].NumWeapon < 0 then
025 TellError('Negative NumWeapons when initializing bn')
026 else
027 begin
028 NuriWeapons: Army[IArny, IBatt].Weapon
fWeaponTypel.NumWeapon;
029 NumAvail :=Num Weapons;
030 end;




032 for Weapon: I to Max Weapon do
*033 Uses[Weapon] :=0;
034 end;
035 with Armny[IArmny, IBatti do
036 begin
037 OldArmny[lArmy, IBattj.NumNewCasualties :=0;
039 OldArmy[IAnmy, IBattI.NumCasualties :=0;
040 OldArmy[IArrny, IBattl.NumMsgsProcessing :=0;
041 OldArmnytlArmny, IBatt].dNumRestored :=0;
042 OldArmy~lArmy, Ieatt].dSquadrons :=0;
043 OldArmnyflArmy, I Batt]. Observations.SomethingSeen false;
044 if (X < 0) or (X > (Params.XDelta*MaxTerrain)) then
045 TellError('Battalion X is out of range during Initialize')
046 else
047 OldArinytlArmny, IBat.X:=X
048 if (Y < 0) or (Y > (Paraxns.YDelta*MaxTerrain)) then
049 TellError('Battalion Y is out of range during Initialize')
050 else
*051 OldArmyflArmny, IBatt].Y :=Y;
052 if (Squadrons > 0) or (Squadrons > MaxSquadron) then
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Fault 2 - Destroyed battalions not initialized.
One possible fix :
begin
TellError('Squadrons is negative or too large in initialize');
if (Squadrons < 0) then
OldArmy[LArmy, IBatt].Squadrons := 0
else
OldArmy[IArmy, IBatt]. Squadrons := MaxSquadron;
end
else
TellError('Squadrons is negative or too large in initialize');
053 else
054 OldArmy[IArmy, IBatt].Squadrons := Sqdl - I (Squadrons);
Fault 3 - Report refers to nonexistent battalions - message superfluous.
One possible fix
for Sqd := I to NArmy[notlArmy] do
OldArmy[IArmy,lBatt].Observations.
NumObserved[Sqdl]:= 0;
055 if (NumJammers < 0) or (NumJammers > Squadrons) then
056 TelLError('NumJammers in impossible range in initialize')
057 else
058 OldArmy[IArmy, IBatt].NunJammers := NumJammers;
059 if (NumFixers < 0) or (NumFixers > Squadrons) then
060 TeUError('NumFixers in impossible range in initialize')
061 else
062 OldArmy[lArmy, IBatt].NumFixers := NumFixers;
063 if (NumProcess < 0) or (NumProcess > Squadrons) then
064 TellError('NumProcess in impossible range in initialize')
065 else
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066 OldArmy[IArmy, IBatt].NumProcess :=NumProcess;
067 if (NunReceive < 0) or (NuinReceive > Squadrons) then
068 TellError('NumReceive in impossible range in initialize')
069 else
070 OldArmyllArmy, IBatt].NumReceive :=NumnReceive;
071 if (NumSend < 0) or (NumSend > Squadrons) then
072 TellErrorC'NumSend in impossible range in initialize')
073 else
074 OldArmy[IArzny, IBattj.NumSend :=NumSend;
075 if FixSuppl < 0 then
076 TellError('FixSuppl negative during initialize')
077 else
078 OldArmy[IArmy, IBatt].FixSuppl :=FixSuppi;
079 UpdateBattalionVelocity(IArmny, IBatt);














085 for I :=1 to (Params.Sample Rate - 2) do
086 begin
087 new(NewRecord);






093 if Duration <= 0 then
094 TellError ('Duration is negative or zero');
095 Time := 0;
096 CreateLOSList;
097 with Params do
098 begin
099 if (NumWTypes < 0) or (NumWTypes > MaxWType) then
100 TellError ('NumWTypes is out of possible range');
101 if XDelta <= 0 then
102 TellError ('XDelta is not greater than zero');
103 if YDelta <= 0 then
104 TellError ('YDelta is not greater than zero');
105 if (NumWEvents < 0) or (NumWEvents > MaxWeather) then
106 TellError ('NumWEvents is out of possible range');
107 if SampleRate < 0 then
108 TellError ('SampleRate is negative');
109 if IMeanAlt <= 0 then
110 TellError ('IMeanAlt is not positive');
111 end;
112 for WEvent := I to Params.NumWEvents do
113 with Weather[WEvent] do
114 begin
115 if TStart > TEnd then
116 TellError ('Bad starting and ending time for weather event');
117 if WRadius <= 0 then
118 TellError ('Bad radius for weather event');
119 if WSeverity > Params.WMaxSeverity then
120 TellError ('WEvent Severity > Params.WMaxSeverity');
121 end;
122 for Side := false to true do
123 for Bat t to NAny[Side] do
124 begin
125 CheckBattConstants(Army[Side, Batt], Parans.NumWTypes);
126 InitBattalion(Side, Batt, Params);
127 for EnemyBatt := to NArmy[not Side] do
128 Action[Side, Batt, EnemyBatt] := None;
129 end;




133 Initialize (Params, Duration, Time);





The folowing is an extract of source code from test program six. The original source code lines are
numbered. The unnumbered lines within the starred lines are annotated with the appropriate fault number,
the fault description, and one possible solution.
procedure PutInCommands
(CommandsFinished : CommandPtr);
var TempPointer : CommandPr;
Observations BattalionObservations;
Targets : WeaponArray;
NumberMsgsProcessing, WeaponType : integer,
001 begin [PutlnCommands}
002 while CommandsFinished <> nil do
003 with CommandsFinishedA do
004 begin
Fault 1 - Command messages implemented in destroyed battalions.
One possible fix :
if OldArmy[DestArmy, Dest].Squadrons > 0 then
begin
005 writeln (Time : 2,': Including command sent to
'DestArmy,',',Dest : 1);
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Fault 2 - Incorrect variable used in procedure call and assignment statement.
One possible fix :
CheckBattalionConstants (Cmsgs[DestArmy, msg] .msg,
Paramns.NumWrypes);
Army[DestAimy, Dest] := Cmsgs [DestArmy, msg].msg,
006 CheckBattalionConstants (msg, Params.NumWTypes);
007 Army[DestArmy, Destj := msg;
008 Observations := OldArmy[DestArmy, Dest] .Observations;
009 NumberMsgsProcessing :=OldArmyllDestArmy, Dest].NumMsgsProcessing;
010 Targets :=OldAnny[DestAnmy, Dest, Weapons;
011 InitBattalion (DestArmy, Dest, Params);
012 OldArmy[DestArmy, Dest].Observations ;= Observations;
013 OldArmy[DestArmy, Dest] .NuxnMsgsProcessing :=NuntMsgsProcessing;
014 for WeaponType :=I to Paramns.NumWTypes do
015 OldArmy[DestArmy, Dest].Weapons[WeaponType].AttList Targets[ WeaponType].
AttList;
Fault 3 - NewArmy not updated to match OldArmy after command messages.
One possible fix:









The following is an extract of source code from test program three. The original source code lines are
numbered. The unnumbered lines within the starred lines are annotated with the appropriate fault number,




var Killed, NewKilled, Sqd : integer,
TotRestoration : real;
001 begin {Restore)
002 with ArmyTemp[Armynum][Batt] do
003 begin
004 TotRestoration := 0;
005 if (Army[Armynum][Batt].Squadrons - Killed >= 1 then
006 for sqd := I to Army[ArmnyNum][Batt].Squadrons do
007 begin
Fault I - Restoration allowed when FixSuppl, FixRate, and NumFixers < 0.
One possible fix :
if SquadStat[Sqd] and (FixSuppl > 0) and (FixRate > 0) and (NumFixers > 0) then
008 if SquadStat[Sqd] then




011 Restoration[Sqd, 01 := 0;
012 TotRestorafion := TotRestoration + Restoration[Sqd, 01;
013 end;
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The following is an extract of source code from test program three. The original source code lines are
numbered. The unnumbered lines within the starred lines are annotated with the appropriate fault number,
the fault description, and one possible solution.
procedure InitVals
var ArmyNum : boolean;
Batt, EBatt, Sqd, WeapType, tim : integer.
001 begin (InitVals)
002 HeadQueue := nil;
003 for ArmyNum := false to true do
004 for Batt:= 1 to NArmy[ArmyNum] do
005 begin
006 for Sqd := 1 to MaxBattalion do
007 for EBatt := to MaxBattalion do
008 begin
009 ObsLocList[ArmyNum, Sqd, EBatt].NumList 0;
010 ObsLocList[ArmyNum, Sqd, EBatt].Head nil;
011 end;






018 dJam := 0;
019 for tim := 0 to I do
020 begin
021 dNumFixers[timl := 0;
022 dNumJammers[tim] := 0;
023 dNumProcess[timl 0;
024 dNumReceive[tim] 0;




029 Velocity := 9999;
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030 Killed := 0;
031 for Sqd := I to Army[ArmyNum][Batt].Squadrons do
032 begin
Fault 1 - Initial velocity counted incorrect if Endurance <= 0.
One possible solution :
if ATny[ArnyNum][Batt].Endurance[Sqd] > 0 then
033 Velocity := min(Velocity,
Anny[AnnyNum][Batt].VO[Sqd];
034 SquadStat[Sqd] := false;
035 dEndurance[Sqd] := 0;
036 for tim := 0 to I do
037 begin
038 Restoration[Sqd, tim] := 0;
039 end;
040 Endurance0[Sqdl := Anny[ArmyNum [Batt].Endurance[Sqd];
041 end;
042 Functional := Army[[ArnyNum][Batt].Squadrons;
043 for WeapType := I to Params.NumWTypes do
044 begin
045 for EBatt := I to NArmy[not ArmnyNum] do
046 NumWeapUsedOn[EBatt], WeapType] := 0;
047 KillersAvail[WeapType] := Army[ArmyNum]
[Batt].Weapon[WeapType].NumWeapon;
048 end;
049 NewHurt[0] := 0;
050 NewHurt[1] 0;
051 NumJammed := 0;
052 for EBatt := I to NArmy[not ArmyNum] do
053 begin








061 if Duration >O0rten











This appendix is divided into two sections and contains the detailed definition of the software failure
regions analyzed during the course of this research. Section A addresses those failure regions that address
only the internal conditions. Section B includes those complete failure regions that include both the
internal and external conditions. The failure regions are numbered in accordance with the fault numbers
originally identified during testing of the source code. Additionally, a brief description of the fault is
included.
A. FAILURE REGIONS WITH INTERNAL CONDITIONS
Fauit 3.1 : Improper count on number of busy processors in procedure ReceiveMessages.
Condition I : (PTR <> NIL) AND ((PTR^.DestArmy = B) AND (PTRA.Destiatt = f))
Condition II : ((PTRA.Processed = recd) AND (PTRA.TimeRecd = MainLoop))
Condition III TRUE
Fault 3.2 : Violation of queue structure when messages of equal priority are ready for processing.
Condition I : TRUE
Condition II : TRUE
Condition III : TRUE
Fault 3.3 : Messages implemented by destroyed battalion in procedure FollowCommandMessages.
Condition I : Match <> NIL




Fault 3.4: Initial Endurance <= 0 reported erroneous in command messages.
Condition I (Match <> NIL)
AND (Army[Arinylndex, Battndex].Squadrons - ArmyTemp[Armylndex,
Baulndexl.Kflled > 0)
AND ((i E [l..Squadrons]) AND (Squadrons > 0))
Condition II ( 3 (e) I Endurancellil (e) < 0)
Condition III: ( 3 (s) I (s > i) AND (s <~= Squadrons) AND (Endurancels] < Endurance [i)
Fault 3.9 :Incorrect variables used in calculation of damage.
Condition I : (Army[AnmyNurnliBatt].Squadrons - ArmyTemp[ArmnyNum]IIBatt].Kiled > 0)
AND ((EBatt E [1.NAnny[EArmy]]) AND (NArmy[EArmyI > 0))
AND ((WeapType E [l..Params.NumWrypes]) AND (Parains.NumW~ypes > 0))
AND (ArmnyTemp[ArmyNum ] [Batt].NumWeaponsUsed~nlBattl [WeapType] > 0)
AND ((WeapToUse E [1..ArmyTemp[ArmnyNum[Batt].NumWeaponsUsedOn
[EBattI[WTypeI) AND (ArmyTemp[ Arm yNum[B att.NumWeaponsUsedOn
[EBatt][WTypeJ > 0))
AND ((ESquad e [1..Army[EArmy] [EBatt]. Squadrons)
AND (Army[IEArmyj [EBat]. Squadrons > 0))
Condition 11 -. TRUE
Condition III :TRUE
Fault 3.11 :Incorrect check in comparing variable M against MaxTerrain.
Condition I :TRUE
Condition 11 ( 3 (x) I M(x) = MaxTerrain)
Condition III :TRUE
Fault 3.12 :Variable TM undefined whcn Dist = 0.
Condition I :(dist <= 0)
Condition 1I (dist <= 0)
Condition III: TRUE
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Fault 3.13 : Observation from side uses wrong points in angle calculation.
Condition I TRUE
Condition II ((SquadLoc[EnemyArmy][e][k].x < TR.x) OR ((SquadLoc[EnemyArmy][e][k].y o TR.y)
AND (SquadLoc[EnemyArmy][e][k].y <> BR.y)))
OR ((SquadLoc[EnemyAnny[e][k].x z TL.x) OR ((SquadLoc[EnemyArmy][e][k].y
o TL.y) AND (SquadLoc[EnemyArmy][e][k].y <> BL.y)))
OR ((SquadLoc[EnemyArmy][e][k].x <> TR.x) AND (SquadLoc[EnemyArmy][e][k].x
<> TL.x))
Condition Ill ((Angle > Army[B][i].ObsMinAnglej]) AND (Params.SampleRate >= 2))
Fault 3.16 : Segmentation violation in Procedure FindA when battalion leaves undefined terrain.
Condition I TRUE
Condition II 3 (x) I ((M(x) >= MaxTerrain) OR (N(x) >= MaxTerrain))
Condition III: TRUE









Fault 3.20 : Incorrect check in comparing variable N against MaxTerrain.
Condition I : TRUE
Condition 11 : ( 3 (x) I N(x) = MaxTerrain)
Condition Ell: TRUE
Fault 3.22 : Restoration allowed when FS < 0.
Condition I :(Army[AmiyNum] [Batt].Squadrons - Killed >= 1)
AND ((Sqd E [l..Army[AnnyNum][Batu].Squadrons)
AND (An y[ArmyNum][Batt].Squadrons > 0))
Condition II :((FixSuppi <= 0) OR (FixRate <= 0) OR NwnFixers <= 0))
Condition III: ( 3 (s) I (s > Sqd) AND (s <= Armny[AnnyNumlfleatuiSquadrons))
AND [min (min (FixRate * NumFixers/Casualties, FixSuppi/Casualties).
Enduranceisi > Restoration~s, 01)
Fault 3.23 : Messages lost if NumProcess goes transiently to 0.
Condition I :((B r= [false] I NArmy[false] > 0) AND (f E [1l..NArmy[falsel))
AN]) ((B e [true] I NArmyltrue] > 0) AND (f r= [l..NArmy[true]))
AND (rec: <> NIL)
AND (Army[l]fJ>numProcess <= ProcBusy)
Condition 11 (Army[B][f].NumProcess <= 0)
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 3.24 : Positions not initialized when Duration = 0.
Condition I : ((AnnyNurn e [true] I NAnnyltrue] > 0) AND (Batt E [l..NArmy[true]))
AND ((ArmyNum e [false] I NArmyf false] > 0) AND (Batt E [l..NArmny[false]))
AN]) ((Sqd E [l..Arny[ArmyNum][Batt].Squadrons)




Fault 3.26 : Initially destroyed battalions not considered in calculation 'Killed.'
Condition I : ((ArmyNum e [true] I NArmy[true] > 0) AND (Batt e [l..NArmy[true]))
AND ((ArmyNum E [false] I N.-my[false] > 0) AND (Batt e [l..NArmy[false]))
AND ((Sqd r [1..Army[ArmyNumjjBatt].Squadrons)
AND (Army[ArnyNum[Batt].Squadrons > 0))
Condition lI : (Army[ArmyNum][Batt].Endurance[SqdI <= 0)
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 3.28 : Procedure FindA returns incorrectly defined value if X < 0.
Condition I : TRUE
Condition II ( 3 (x) I ((M(x) < 0) OR (N(x) < 0))
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 3.43 : Improper observation allowed when SR < 2.
Condition I : (Army[not B][el.Endurance[k] > 0)
AND ((k = [l..Army[EnemyArmy][e].Squadrons])
AND (Army[EnemyArmy][e].Squadrons] > 0))
AND ((e r [1..NArmylEnemyArmy]]) AND (NArmy[EnemyArmy] > 0))
AND (Army[B][i].Endurance UI > 0)
AND ((j r [1..Army[B][i].Squadrons) AND (Army[B][i].Squadrons > 0))
AND ((B e [true] I NArmy[true] > 0) AND (i c [l..NArmy[true]]))
AND ((B E [false] I NArmy[falsel > 0) AND (i E [1..NArmy[falsel]))
Condition II : ((Params.SampleRate < 2) AND (Angle > Army[B][i].ObsMinAngle[j]))
Condition III: ((Angle > Army[B][i].ObsMinAngleU]) AND (Params.SampleRate > 2))
Fault 3.44 : Improper variable assignment.
Condition I : ((EBatt e [1..NArmy[EArmy] AND (NArmy[EArmy] > 0))
AND ((WearType r [l..Params.NumWTypes) AND (Params.NumWTypes > 0))
Condition II : (Army[ArmyNum][Bau].Weapon[WeapType].FireRate <= 0)
Condition III: TRUE
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Fault 3.45 : Variables improperly set in destroyed battalions.
Condition I : TRUE
Condition H : (Anny[ArmyNum][Batt].Squadrons - ArmyTemp[AnnyNum][Batt].Killed <= 0)
Condition II: TRUE
Fault 6.1 : Reversed parameters leads to improper observation results.
Condition I : (AngleSubGreater = TRUE)
Condition H : ((SXe <> SXg) OR (SYe <> SYg))
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 6.2 : No check on send time if commands of equal priority are implemented at same time.
Condition I : (CommandsFinished <> NIL) AND OldArmy[DestArmy, Dest].Squadrons > 0)
Condition II : (Cmsgs[DestArmy, msgl.msg <> CommandsFinished^.msg
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 6.3 : Improper calculation of variable due to incorrect denominator.
Condition I : TRUE
Condition II TRUE
Condition III : [((SXg <> SXe) OR (SYg <> SYe))
Fault 6.5 : Incorrect calculation - change in available weapons used vice running sum.
Condition I : ((Weap E [I..MaxWType] AND (MaxWType > 0))
Condition II : (OldArmy[lArmy, IBatt].Weapons[IWeap].NumAvail > 0)
Condition Ill : TRUE
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Fault 6.6 :Divide by zero when NumWeapons = 0 when assigning target coordinates.
Condition I :((EBatt e [1..NArmy[not(IArmy)fl) AND (NAminylnot(IArmy)I > 0))
AND (OldAnny[not(IAriny), Eeatt].Squadrons > 0)
AND (LWeap r= [I.Params.NumWTypes]) AND (Params.NuxnWrypes > 0))
AND ((I c: (1..NumWeapons(IArmy, IBatt, EBatt, LWeap)])
AND (NumWeapons(IAnny, Ibatt, Eeatt, LWeap) > 0))
Condition H : (OldArmyllArmy, IBatt].Weapons[LWeap].NuxnWeapons = 0)
Condition IlIl TRUE
Fault 6.7 : Undefined pointer reference due to no re-initialization of AttList.
Condition I TRUE
Condition II TRUE
Condition Ill : TRUE
Fault 6.8 : Undefined pointer reference due to no initialization of AttList.
Condition I :((WeaponType r= [l..Paraxns.NumWtypes) AND (Params.NumWTypes > 0))
Condition 11 TRUE
Condition Ill: TRUE
Fault 6.10 : Report refers to nonexistent battalion - message superfluous.
Condition I :TRUE
Condition 11 TRUE
Condition Ill : TRUE
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Fault 6.11 Message improperly deleted if more recently sent message is placed ahead of it.
Condition I :(CommandsFinished <> NEL) AND (WhereFinished <> NIL)
AND [(WherelnFinishedA.Priority <> CommandtoCollect.Priority
AND ((WherelnFinishedA.Plionity <> CommandrroCollectA.Pliority)




Fault 6.12 :Improper variable used to calculate jamming.
Condition I (OldArny[DestArmy, DestBattl.NumReceive > 0)
AND ((Batt E [l..NArrny[not DestArmy]) AND (NArmy[not DestArmy] > 0))
AND (Armytnot DestArmy, Batt]. ComnmJamEff > 0)
Condition 11 Armylinot DestAriny, BattI.CommlamRadius <> Armylnot DestAminy,Battl.CommJamnEff
AND (Army[not DestArmy, Batt].CommJaxnRadius - Distance(OldArmy
[inot DestArmy, Batt].X, OldArmy[not DestArmy, Battl.Y,
OldArmy[DestArrny, Batti .X, OldArmy[DestArmy, Batt] .Y)
Condition III :TRUE
Fault 6.13 :Command messages implemented in destroyed battalions.
Condition I (CommandsFinished <> NIL)
Condition 11 (OldArrny[DestAnny, Dest].Squadrons > 0)
Condition lIII TRUE
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Fault 6.14 : Variable InOwnObs not initialized.
Condition I (ReportsFinished <> NIL)
AND ((EnemyBatt e [L..NArmy[not DestArmyl]) AND (NArmy[not DestArmy] > 0))
AND (OldAmy[not DestArmy, EnemyBatt].Squadrons > 0)
AND ((SentSquadObs E [1..SumofSentObstoOneBn.NumObserved[EnemyBatt])
AND (SumofSentObstoOneBn.NumObserved[EnemyBatt] > 0))
Condition II : TRUE
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 6.15 : NewArmy not updated to match OldArmy after command messages.
Condition I : ((CommandsFinished <> NIL) AND (OldArmny[DestArmy, Destl.Squadrons > 0))
Condition II TRUE
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 6.16 : Observation improperly implemented.
Condition I : TRUE
Condition II : (P = NIL) AND (Params.SampleRate <> 2)
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 6.17 : NumWeapons > 0 when Army.Weapon.FireRate = 0.
Condition I : TRUE
Condition II : (OldArmy[lArmy, IBatt].Weapon[IWeap].FireRate <= 0)
Condition III: (OldArmy[IAmy, IBatt].Weapons[IWeap].NumAvail <> 0)
OR ((KP < LL) AND (KP > KAKF)) OR ((KP >= LL) AND (LL > KAKF))
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Fault 6.18 : Report messages blocked by bad test in procedure IncludeCommObs.
Condition I : (NextReport o NIL) AND (NextReportA.Finished = Time)
Condition II : (OldArmy[DestArmy, Dest].Squadrons > 0)
AND ((Time - Army[DestArmy, Dest].ObsXpire) > TimeSent)
Condition ll : TRUE
Fault 6.20 : InitBattalion doesn't initialize destroyed battalions.
Condition I :TRUE
Condition II (ArmylIArmy, IBatt].Squadrons < 0)
OR (Army[lArmy, IBatt].Squadrons > MaxSquadron)
Condition III: TRUE
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B. FAILURE REGIONS WITH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONDITIONS
Fault 3.10 : Duration = 0 is considered erroneous when it's not.
Condition I : (Duration <= 0)
Condition II : (Duration = 0)
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 3.17 : Result variables not set if Duration < 0.
Condition I : (Duration <= 0)
Condition II : (Duration < 0)
Condition III: TRUE
Fault 3.5 : Initial velocity counted incorrect if Endurance <= 0.
Condition I ((ArmyNum e [true] I NAnny[true] > 0) AND (Batt E [1..NArmy[truel]))
AND ((ArmyNum e [false] I NArnyfalse] > 0) AND (Batt E [l..NArmy[false]]))
AND ((Sqd E [l..Army][AnnyNum])[Batt).Squadrons])
AND (Army[ArmyNum][Batt].Squadrons > 0))
Condition II (Arny[ArmyNum][Batt].Endurance[Sqd] <= 0)
AND ((Army[ArmyNum][Batt].VO[Sqd] < y
where ((y E fx I x = 9999]) OR ( 3 (s) I I <= s <= (Sqd - 1)
AND x = Army[ArmyNum][Batt].VO[s]))
Condition III: ((( 3 (s) I (s > Sqd)) AND (s <= Army[ArmyNum][Batt].Squadrons))
AND (Arny[ArmyNurn][Batt].VO[s] < Velocity))
Fault 6.4 : Incorrect equality check in repeat.. .until loop.
Condition I : TRUF
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